Ralph Schoenman
The Hidden History of Zionism
Chapter 3
Colonizing Palestine
In 1917, there were 56,000 Jews in Palestine and 644,000
Palestinian Arabs. In 1922, there were 83,794 Jews and 663,000 Arabs. In
1931, there were 174,616 Jews and 750,000 Arabs. [32]
Collaborating with British Colonialism
With the forging of a tacit alliance with the British,
the Zionists now received support on the ground for their conquest of the
land. The process was described by the Palestinian poet and analyst, Ghassan
Khanafani
P.S : Ghassan was assassinated with his 9-year-old niece by Zionists
in Beirut, 8/7/1972
Despite the fact that a large share of Jewish capital
was allocated to rural areas, and despite the presence of British imperialist
military forces and the immense pressure exerted by the administrative
machine in favor of the Zionists, the latter achieved only minimal results
with respect to the settlement of land.
They, nevertheless, seriously damaged the status of the Arab rural population.
Ownership by Jewish groups of urban and rural land rose from 300,000 dunums
in 1929 [67,000 acres] to 1,250,000 dunums in 1930 [280,000 acres]. The
purchased land was insignificant from the point of view of mass colonization
and of the settlement of the "Jewish problem". But the expropriation of
one million dunums - almost one third of the agricultural land - led to
a severe impoverishment of Arab peasants and Bedouins.
By 1931, 20,000 peasant families had been evicted by the Zionists. Furthermore,
agricultural life in the underdeveloped world, and the Arab world in particular,
is not merely a mode of production, but equally a way of social life. Thus,
in addition to the loss of land, Arab rural society was being destroyed
by the process of colonization. [33]
British imperialism promoted the economic destabilization
of the indigenous Palestinian economy. The Mandatory Government granted
a privileged status to Jewish capital, awarding it 90% of the concessions
in Palestine. This enabled the Zionists to gain control of the economic
infrastructure (road projects, Dead Sea minerals, electricity, ports, etc.).
By 1935, Zionists controlled 872 of a total of 1,212 industrial firms in
Palestine. Imports related to Zionist industries were exempted from taxes.
Discriminatory work laws were passed against the Arab workforce resulting
in large scale unemployment and a substandard existence for those who were
able to find employment.
The 1936 Uprising
Loss of land and repression heightened Palestinian awareness
of the fate intended for them and fueled a great uprising which lasted
from 1936 to 1939.
The revolt assumed the form of civil disobedience and armed insurrection.
Peasants left their villages to join fighting units which were formed in
the mountains. Arab patriots from Syria and Jordan soon entered the struggle.
The decision to withhold taxes was taken May 7, 1936, at a conference
attended by one hundred fifty delegates representing all sectors of the
population and a general strike swept Palestine.
British reaction was immediate and harsh. Martial law was declared July
30, 1936 - approximately five months after the uprising had begun - and
widespread repression was unleashed. Anyone suspected of organizing or
sympathizing with the general strike or other resistance was detained.
Houses were blown up throughout Palestine. A large section of the city
of Jaffa was destroyed by the British on June 18, 1936, rendering 6,000
people homeless. Homes, as well, in the surrounding communities were demolished.
Britain sent large numbers of troops to Palestine to quell the revolt
(estimated at 20,000). By the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938, however,
British forces were losing control to the armed popular revolt.
The Zionists as Police Enforcers
It was at this point that the British began to rely on
the Zionists who provided them with a unique resource they had never tapped
in any of their colonies: a local force which had made common cause with
British colonialism and was highly mobilized against the indigenous population.
If before this the Zionists had handled many of the tasks of reprisal,
they now played a larger role in the escalated repression which was to
include mass arrests, assassinations and executions. In 1938, 5,000 Palestinians
were imprisoned, of whom 2,000 were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment;
148 people were executed by hanging and over 5,000 homes were demolished.
[34]
Zionist forces were integrated with British intelligence and became the
police enforcers of draconian British rule. A "quasi-police force" was
established to provide cover for the armed Zionist presence encouraged
by the British. There were 2,863 recruits to the quasi-police force, 12,000
men were organized in the Haganah, and 3,000 in Jabotinsky’s National
Military Organization (Irgun). [35] In the summer of 1937 the quasi-police
force was named the "Defense of the Jewish Colonies", and later the "Colony
Police".
Ben Gurion called the quasi-police force an ideal "framework" for the
training of the Haganah. Charles Orde Wingate, the British officer in charge,
was, in essence, the founder of the Israeli army. He trained such figures
as Moshe Dayan in terrorism and assassination.
By 1939, Zionist forces working with the British rose to 14,411 organized
into ten well-armed groups of Colony Police, each commanded by a British
officer, with an official of the Jewish Agency as second in command. By
the spring of 1939, the Zionist force included sixty-three mechanized units,
each consisting of eight to ten men.
The Peel Report
A Royal Commission was established in 1937, under the
direction of Lord Peel, to determine the causes of the 1936 revolt. The
Peel Commission concluded that the two primary factors were Palestinian
desire for national independence and Palestinian fear of the establishment
of a Zionist colony on their land. The Peel Report analyzed a series of
other factors with uncommon candor. These were:
-
The spread of the Arab nationalist spirit outside Palestine
-
Increasing Jewish immigration after 1933
-
The ability of the Zionists to dominate public opinion in Britain because
of the tacit support of the government
-
Lack of Arab confidence in the (good intentions) of the British government
-
Palestinian fear of continued land purchases by Jews.
-
The evasiveness of the Mandatory government about its intentions regarding
Palestinian sovereignty.
The national movement consisted of the feudal landowners,
Islamic leaders and representatives of peasants and workers.
Its demands were:
-
An immediate stop to Zionist immigration
-
Cessation and prohibition of the transfer of the ownership of Arab lands
to Zionist colonists
-
The establishment of a democratic government in which Palestinians would
have the controlling voice. [36]
Analysis of the Revolt
Ghassan Kanafani described the uprising:
The real cause of the revolt was the fact that the acute
conflict involved in the transformation of Palestinian society from an
Arab agricultural-feudal-clerical one into a Jewish (Western) industrial
bourgeois one, had reached its climax. ...The process of establishing the
roots of colonialism and transforming it from a British mandate into Zionist
settler colonialism ...reached its climax in the mid-thirties, and in fact
the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement was obliged to adopt
a certain form of armed struggle because it was no longer able to exercise
its leadership at a time when the conflict had reached decisive proportions.
[37]
The failure of the Mufti and other Islamic leaders, of
feudal land owners to support the peasants and workers to the end, enabled
the colonial regime and the Zionists to crush the rebellion after three
years of heroic struggle. In this the British were aided decisively by
the treachery of the traditional Arab regimes, who were dependent upon
their colonial sponsors.
The Palestinian national struggle has been continuous since 1918 and has
been accompanied by one or another form of organized armed resistance.
It has also included civil disobedience, general strikes, nonpayment of
taxes, refusal to carry identity cards, boycotts and demonstrations.
NOTES
32. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest (Delmar, N.Y.:
The Caravan Books, 1979), pp.43-44.
33. Ghassan Kanafani, The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine
(New York, Committee for a Democratic Palestine).
34. Ibid., p.96.
35. Ibid., p.39.
36. Ibid., p.31.
37. Ibid.
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